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Introducton
Islamic resurgence of the 1970s was undeniably an important force that generated new
currents of political Islam in Malaysia.  New Islamist organisations that were critical of the
West and existing political status quo emerged on the political landscape calling for the
construction of a new social order based on Islamic morality and laws.  Although they
shared the common belief that the Quran, hadith and Islamic theological treatises could
provide the necessary guidelines to build such a society, these organisations differed
markedly in their answers to the question of what constituted a contemporary Islamic
society and the strategies they adopted for the realisation of that society.  The strategies
ranged from the construction of Islamic perspectives to comprehend reality and human
problems to the formation of loosely structured congregational groups or jemaah to help
forge moral solidarity among Muslims in and outside Malaysia.  On the Malaysian
political scene, these organisations vied with two Malay dominated political parties, the
United Malays National Organisation or UMNO and the Islamic Party of Malaysia
(Parti Islam Se Malaysia) or PAS which had been championing Islam in the country.  The
competition was not without consequences for their role, identity and survival as political
actors.  Some organisations rose to become influential pressure groups while others were
forced out of the political arena.  
One of the new Islamist organisations that met a sad ending was Jemaah Darul Arqam
or Al Arqam, in short.  Al Arqam emerged in 1968 as a small community of purified
Muslims that sought to resurrect the classical Islamic society that existed in seventh
century Medina, Saudi Arabia.  Over the years, Al Arqam grew in size, membership and
popularity and became quite a formidable force in Malaysian politics questioning the
political system and arguing for the establishment of an Islamic theocracy.  The
movement did not get to realise its political agenda because in 1994 that is after twenty six
years in existence the Malaysian government decided to ban it on charges that Al
Arqam’s messianic messages about the coming of a messiah called Imam Mahdi, deviated
grossly from established beliefs.  
Now Al Arqam’s experience raises interesting questions about the potentials and
limits of Islamist organisations to spread Islam and to realise their political agenda given
that in Malaysia, the state reserves the right to determine the parameters of Islamic
orthodoxy and to apprehend individuals and groups who promote unorthodox ways of
comprehending the divine.  Unfortunately past studies on Islamic resurgence offer very
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little information about this matter.  Most of them merely suggest various approaches to
understanding Islamic movements, Al Arqam included,1) and do not consider changes in
terms of ideological propagation and strategies of mass mobilisation as Al Arqam
responded to developments within the movement itself and the changing political
scenario.  
What these changes were and how they affected the survival of Al Arqam as a political
actor in Malaysia will be made clear in this essay.  This essay is divided into three parts.
The first part provides an overview of the expressions of political Islam before and after
Malaysia became an independent nation state.  The second part describes the history,
structural organisation and ideological basis of Al Arqam with a view of making apparent
some of the defining features of the movement.  The third and final part analyses changes
in Al Arqam’s stance with regards to issues of political engagement as the movement
strove to develop, sustain and defend itself as a dakwah organisation in light of changing
political scenario in Malaysia.  
Political Islam in Malaysia: An Overview
Malaysia is a multi-racial and multi-religious country with a population of about 22
million.  One of the distinctive features of the Malaysian social system is the close link
between Islam and the culture and politics of the Malays who happen to be the most
culturally and politically dominant ethnic group in the country.  Islam was introduced into
the country in the fifteenth century by Arab and Indian traders.  Despite its alien origin,
the religion gradually replaced indigenous beliefs and traditions as the most critical
component of Malay identity and became a potent organising force in Malay society.
Islam was also instrumental in bringing the Malays into the cultural orbit of the Islamic
world which has as its centre, Mekka in Saudi Arabia through the hajj institution and the
vast teacher-student networks that the religion was well known for.  As such, happenings
in other parts of the Islamic world were and still are likely to have an impact in a big or
small way on Muslims in Malaysia too.  
Malaysia first witnessed the upsurge of Islam in the 1920s when the country, then
called Malaya, was still under British rule.  During that time, a small group of religious
scholars or ulamak who were modernist in their thinking emerged on the cultural
landscape of the country calling on Muslims to purify Islam of indigenous accretions,
reject traditionalist interpretations of Islam, and exercise ijtihad 2) so they could empathise
with Western rationalism, science and technology.  Some of their fellow ulamak
responded to the reformers’ call by restructuring their own pondok 3) to become modern
Islamic schools or madrasah while those who were close to the centre of power put
pressure on British administrators to give Malay religious elite more space in the state’s
bureaucracy.  As a result, by 1930, madrasah replaced pondok as the key Islamic socialising
agents in all the states.  The Islamic bureaucracy in each state was also expanded to
include within it the Council of Islam and Malay Customs, the Department of Islamic
Religious Affairs, religious offices and a system of Shari’ah courts.4)
In the 1940s, Islam re-asserted itself this time on the political landscape of the country.
Signs of this reassertion of Islam could be seen in the establishment of Islamic political
parties, the Hizbul Muslimin in 1941 and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se
Tanah Melayu or PAS) in 1951.5) The objectives of political Islam at that time were to
44
mobilise Malays to fight against British colonialism for independence and to establish the
Islamic state (Darul Islam) through the democratic process.  Indeed after Malaysia became
a nation state, PAS committed itself to parliamentary democracy and participated in the
general elections gaining support mainly from rural Malays in the northern Malay states
of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis.  
The 1970s saw another wave of political Islam in Malaysia this time in the form of
several Islamist organisations that were committed to bringing back Islam to the centre
stage of public life and rebuilding Malaysian society along Islamic lines.  The most
notable of these organisations were the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan
Belia Islam Malaysia or ABIM), Jemaah Tabligh, Islamic Republic Group and Al Arqam.
It was the proselytisation activities of these groups on the campuses of local universities
and urban neighbourhoods in the city of Kuala Lumpur that constituted what local
people described as the dakwah phenomenon or Islamic resurgence.  Actually the term
‘dakwah’ means ‘to invite one to Islam’ but in the 1970s, it had quite a foreboding tone.
This is because dakwah as expressed by the religious activists denoted a challenge to the
state, political elite and religious authority with respect to their role and effectiveness in
strengthening Malaysia’s identity as an Islamic country in the face of the modernisation
challenge.  
If in the 1940s political Islam emerged to protest against British domination, in the
1970s it resurfaced to address and formulate responses to social issues that arose as
Malaysia intensified its modernisation and industrialisation programmes.  After achieving
independence in 1957, Malaysia continued the pattern of industrial production that the
British set in motion when it ruled the country.  Capitalist-based development projects
were implemented resulting in the expansion of domestic and international trade, greater
urbanisation and the improvement of the country’s educational, transport and
communication systems.  No doubt Malaysia’s Gross Domestic Product grew but
economic development also had undesirable effects on the lives on the people.  Among
other things, the process generated economic and cultural disparities between the haves
and the have-nots and caused a breakdown of the traditional family institution.  It also
ushered in new lifestyles that celebrated values of individualism and materialism that were
alien to the local people.  In the political realm, the institutionalisation of representative
democracy had been successful in increasing public participation in decision making but
the process also encouraged communal politics, thereby intensifying the racial divide
between Malays and non-Malays.  So looking at societal development in the years
between 1957 and 1970, two things became apparent.  One, not all segments of
Malaysia’s population had been able to reap the benefit of modernisation and
industrialisation; and two, that the state still lacked the ability to provide a single frame of
reference or an ideological focus in terms of which to develop the country.
It was against this economic and political background that political Islam resurfaced
demanding the state and society to source Islamic philosophy and teachings to rebuild
society.  The Islamists call for a re-islamisation of Malaysian society proceeded from a
criticism of the West, its institutions, practices and those secular ideologies such as
socialism, communism and nationalism that it produced.  The Islamists located the root
causes of rural poverty, ethnic polarisation, loss of religiosity, marginalisation of Islam and
the breakdown of family values to Malaysia’s dependence on the West.  They wanted the
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westernisation and secularisation of Malaysia to be halted and the masses to regulate their
social life according to Islamic laws, rules and norms.  Interestingly, none of the Islamist
organisations or dakwah groups as they were popularly called, pushed for the
establishment of an Islamic state like PAS did in the 1950s although the setting up of
theocracy did later loom on the political agenda of one of the organisations.  These
organisations too did not involve themselves in partisan politics and constituted an
important sector of the civil society.  
Another fascinating feature of this new wave of political Islam concerns its actors.  Most
of them were young men and women in the mid-twenties thirties and forties.  They
were members of the urban-based Malay middle class and though highly educated did
not possess formal training in the Islamic religious sciences.  In short, the dakwah people
were not religious experts but ordinary men and women who ordinarily were not
expected to be in the forefront of an Islamic reform movement.  Yet this time, it was them
not the religious scholars who came forward to organise Muslims for religious and
political change.  They accomplished this not through elaborate theological discourses but
through simple observance of Islamic rules governing Muslim dress code, dietary habits
and devotional acts.  Regardless of the methods used, the dakwah people were quite
effective in getting Malays to demonstrate their Muslimness by regularly attending study
groups or usrah to discuss the Quran, avoiding those food items that contained alcohol
and products derived from pigs, and saying assalamu’alaikum instead of the usual ‘good
morning’ when greeting one another.  
The third intriguing feature of political Islam of the 1970s was that it first emerged in
the city, more specifically in Kuala Lumpur, before spreading into the rural areas.  This
should not come as a big surprise considering that Kuala Lumpur was the only city in
Malaysia that was greatly affected by the development trends discussed above.  Originally
a Chinese dominated town, Kuala Lumpur started to admit a large number of Malays
from the rural areas that flocked to the city in search of jobs and education at the
universities and other institutions of higher learning located there.  These rural migrants
soon found that in the urban setting, they could not easily invoke kinship bonds to help
regulate their social and religious affairs as in the villages.  So in the absence of kin
network, many of them resorted to forming informal religious groups as a new basis for
them to cooperate and to regulate their religious life.  These groups later became
important social contexts within which a new consciousness of Islamic philosophy,
history, civilisation and politics was nourished and for the religiously motivated men and
women to gather and develop initiatives that would make Islam more high profile in
Malaysian society.  
The Al Arqam Movement: Establishing an Organisation
Now Al Arqam originated as one of the informal religious groups mentioned above.
What was striking about Al Arqam was that it developed in terms of size, membership
and popularity to eventually become a major dakwah organisation in Malaysia.  When it
was still active, the movement stood out from the other dakwah groups because of its
communal living, Middle Eastern dress forms and over glorification of the leader of the
movement as a holy and saintly person.  What follows is a description of how and why Al
Arqam developed these distinctive characteristics.  
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The founder
Al Arqam was founded by Ashaari Muhammad, a religious teacher.  Born in 1938 in
the state of Negeri Sembilan, Ashaari attended the Madhad Hishamuddin, an Islamic
college in the town of Klang in the nearby state of Selangor.  He graduated from the
college with a Sijil Thanawi Khalis, which was a certificate awarded to a student who had
completed lower secondary education in the religious sciences.  By today’s standard, the
Sijil Thanawi Khalis was a low qualification but in the 1950s, it helped Ashaari secure a job
as a religious teacher (ustaz ) in a nearby school.  Ashaari came to maturity just as the
British were about to leave Malaya and was therefore, supportive of the islamically
inspired politics of dissidence of PAS.  In fact, in 1958, he joined the party and was active
in one of the party’s branches in the state of Selangor.  
He however was disillusioned with party politics and left PAS in 1968 to start his own
dakwah group.  As the first step in that direction, Ashaari conducted study circles or usrah
sessions to discuss the Quran and Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad with his friends,
neighbours and colleagues.  His tactics were to win the recognition of the religious
authority as an Islamic missionary or da’i and to develop a following from among the
urban dwellers.  Ashaari had little difficulty achieving both objectives because of his
educational background and experience in party politics.  Having secured public
recognition and a small following from among members of the working class living in and
around Datuk Keramat, a Malay enclave in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Ashaari decided to
give a name to his group.  At first, he called it Kumpulan Rumah Putih, literally meaning
the ‘White House Group’ after the house where his group regularly met and which
happened to be painted white.  Ashaari later renamed the group Jemaah Darul Arqam after
the name of one of Prophet Muhammad’s companions, Arqam bin Abi, who bequeathed
his house for the cause of Islam.  By this time, Ashaari who was more captivated by the
teachings of classical ulamak than modern Islamic thinkers, had already envisioned the
restoration of the ideal Islamic society that once flourished in Medina in the seventh
century.  To him, islamisation of Malaysian society involved recreating this ideal society
or masyarakat salafusolleh as he called it.  So to realise his goal, in 1971 Ashaari and his
followers pooled their resources and purchased a piece of land about four acres in size in
Kampung Sungai Pencala, a Malay settlement about seventeen kilometres from
downtown Kuala Lumpur.  
The commune system
On this land, Ashaari and his followers built the first Islamic village or commune in
Malaysia and called it Medina Al Arqam.  Ashaari made it certain that social life in the
commune was organised to reflect the egalitarian and communitarian principles held by
the morally righteous people of ancient times.  So in terms of attire, the female residents
of Medina Al Arqam wore black gowns and face veils while the men wore green, grey or
white robes ( jubbah ) and adopted turbans as their headgear.  In Medina Al Arqam,
families lived in small barely furnished houses which they built themselves and drew from
a common pool of resources money and goods for their daily needs.  Economically, Al
Arqam was critical of capitalism and Malay habit of depending for subsidy from the
government.  So in the commune, the residents demonstrated self-reliance and economic
independence by cooperating to produce vegetables, noodles, cakes and soya sauce for
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sale in the open market.  Consistent with Al Arqam’s emphasis on frugality, simplicity and
inconspicuousness, marriage ceremonies in the commune were devoid of any pomp
and ceremony.  For greater family bonding, men in Al Arqam commune more often than
not contracted polygamous marriages while women cooperated to look after each others’
children.  
The core of religious life in Medina Al Arqam consisted of several ritual practices
which were done on a collective basis.  In addition to performing the obligatory prayers
required of all Muslims, commune residents also observed the commendable prayers and
organised the mauled tahlil twice a week to commemorate Prophet Muhammad.6) They
also performed the wirid that was peculiar to tareqat Muhammadiyah, a Sufi order
founded by Sheikh Suhaimi bin Abdullah and of which Ashaari was a member.  The
function of the wirid was for Al Arqam followers to establish mystical and spiritual bonds
with deceased saints (wali Allah ), a religious practice that Muslims in main-stream society
would hardly do.  By performing these rites regularly and on a collective basis, Al
Arqam members believed that Medina Al Arqam would be a consecrated ground with a
soul of its own.  Religious talks, usrah sessions and consciousness raising campaigns also
featured significantly in the religious life of the residents of the Islamic commune.  These
religious activities helped heighten the religious consciousness of the commune members
as well as induce discipline among them.
Authority structure
The establishment of communes was only one aspect of the Al Arqam organisation.
For the day to day administration of Al Arqam as a dakwah movement, Ashaari created
several administrative units called syukbah to help regulate Al Arqam activities in the
realms of religion, mission work, education, publications, public relations and business.
Each syukbah was headed by a sheikh who in turn was assisted by the naqib, mudir and amil.
In short, Al Arqam was also characterised by an elaborate network of authority with
Ashaari as Sheikh ul-Arqam or the supreme leader.  Believing strongly in social equality,
Ashaari tried to minimise status differences between him and his followers by
incorporating as many Al Arqam members as possible in the movement’s authority
structure.  He gave them titles such as khalifah, sheikh, amil, and mudir and made them
responsible for overseeing the affairs in the various Al Arqam communes, conducting
religious consciousness raising campaigns, running the syukbah, coordinating Al Arqam
missionary activities, organising and leading the Al Arqam choir and a host of other
things.  The idea was to get as many people as possible to experience being leaders so
status distinctions could be played down.  
Membership
Membership in Al Arqam was opened to people from all walks of life.  In the initial
years of its establishment, Al Arqam recruited members from among working class
Malays who lived in and around Kuala Lumpur.  In late 1970s, Al Arqam managed to
attract university students, teachers, government officials, entrepreneurs and professionals
to join it as full time or part time members.  This sub-division of members into two
categories was done on the basis of how much time a person worked to actualise Al
Arqam’s programmes.  Full time members comprised of those individuals who spent full
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time operating Al Arqam’s institutions and business enterprises playing roles as
missionaries, doctors, midwives nurses, teachers, graphic artists, choir boys, sale assistants,
tailors, editors, writers and others.  The part-time members on the other hand were
those men and women who were employed elsewhere and contributed several hours a
day or week working for Al Arqam.  
Ideological basis
Al Arqam was no different from the other dakwah groups in attributing the disunity of
the ummah to the eagerness of the Muslims to adopt western habits, norms and institutions
and in drawing on existing Islamic doctrines and concepts to provide an ideological
grounding for its members.  Ashaari selected three beliefs from the Islamic cultural
repertoire, reinterpreted them and made them the distinctive dogma of his movement.  
The first was the belief in the need for a Muslim to purify his or her thoughts through
repentance (taubat ).  The emphasis on repentance had a lot to do with Al Arqam’s
assumption that Muslims had not only strayed from the righteous path by adopting
Western habits and norms but also allowed Satan and their baser selves (nafsu) to arouse
their souls to worldly concerns.  So to gain salvation, Al Arqam required its followers to
stimulate their souls to glorify Allah and to resonate to issues that were spiritual and other-
worldly.  The purpose was to help a Muslim understand his inner self and come to grips
with his own aptitude, character, desires and strength.  It was further believed that with
this knowledge, a Muslim could harness those aspects of his inner self to develop good
attributes (mahmudah ) and potentials for work.  This knowledge according to Al Arqam
could only be acquired if a person detached himself from mainstream society, join Al
Arqam, repent and then venture forth on a spiritual quest to acquire mystical vision
(syuhud ) and enlightenment (kasyaf ).  The ultimate status that an Al Arqam member
should strive to achieve was that of a mursyid or spiritual leader for he was one who
possessed the uncanny ability to discern things secret and hidden having been endowed
by Allah an unveiled vision or mukasyaf.  This status, Al Arqam argued, could only be
achieved if the seeker of the unveiled vision subjected himself to the tutelage of a Sufi
sheikh and lived in the consecrated surroundings of the Al Arqam’s communes.  
The need for Muslims to jihad also featured significantly in Al Arqam’s ideological
framework.  Jihad was initially interpreted to mean the moral struggle that an Al Arqam
member would have to undertake in order to purify himself of foreign accretions, to
exercise self-control (mujahadatunnafs ) and to develop inner strength.  Ashaari considered
jihad of this nature necessary to help Malays project a new Islamic identity, become
self-reliant and morally righteous.  The idea was to demonstrate that jihad actually took
many forms, not necessarily riots and armed struggle as commonly thought.  
The third important belief that Al Arqam members subscribed to was the coming of
the messiah, called Imam Mahdi.  The Mahdi was an enlightened and well-guided
religious person who would appear in the age of the great confusion to fight against the
enemies of Islam and restore a reign of peace and justice.  This belief had taken deep
roots among Al Arqam members having been convinced by their leader that
contemporary Malaysian society characterised by corruption, low moral standards and
numerous malpractices by those in power, was in a state of confusion as forewarned in the
Quran.  As such, the Mahdi would soon appear and Al Arqam, being the only jemaah in
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the world that adhered to the Prophet’s Sunnah, would produce the calendrical renewer
(saiyidul mujaddid ) who would herald the coming of the Mahdi. 
Clearly, communal living, beliefs in the importance of repentance, jihad the great
chaos and the Mahdi, implied that Al Arqam’s strategy for changing or islamising
Malaysian society was to create ways to denounce that society as degenerative and to
build an alternative social structure or a counter-culture.  Indeed Al Arqam when it was
still active did produce that counter-culture.  This counter-culture was one that dearly
prized a form of religious leadership that was free from state control.  This form of
religious leadership was not something new to the Malays.  In fact, in their history, this
form of leadership did exist once in pre-colonial times and was represented by itinerant
religious scholars who preferred to wander around spreading Islam rather than serve the
rulers.  That Ashaari tried to revive this form of religious leadership and made it one of
the defining features of Al Arqam could be seen from his own actions and the symbols of
prestige that he used to drive home the point that he did not need state sanction or
approval in whatever he did.  For example, Ashaari did not bother to register Al Arqam
as a non-governmental organisation and distributed without hesitation Sufi titles such as
sheikh, khalifah and imam to his followers.  
Another distinguishing feature of this counter-culture was its emphasis on boundary
demarcation.  Al Arqam strongly believed that it alone possessed the truth and that
other people should live by that truth.  One important corollary of this belief was the clear
lines of social separation between Al Arqam members and non-members.  At the
ideological level, this line was evident from Al Arqam’s message concerning the messiah
while at the behavioural level, it was reflected in the Middle Eastern dress form, ritual
practices and spartan lifestyle of its members.  This concern with boundary maintenance
and boundary demarcation served two purposes which were one, to highlight the
distinctiveness and traditionalist identity of Al Arqam and two, to bring into focus those
aspects of mainstream Malaysian culture namely consumerism and materialism which to
Al Arqam were anathema.  
Finally the counter-culture that Al Arqam generated was also one that was willing to
pursue change from the current state of affairs to another.  More specifically, the change
that Al Arqam sought was the restoration of a god-centred and ulamak-led society.  This
change was anticipated in messianism when God would send the Mahdi, thereby
recreating the longed for ideal situation.  At the personal level, Al Arqam members
anticipated that change would result from their own acts of worship as well as the
concerted efforts of the movements’ actions in the here and now.  
The Al Arqam Movemnet: Defending the Organisation
The 1970s
In its history, the heyday day for organising, mobilising and visibility of Al Arqam were
the 1970s and 1980s.  In relation to this, the pivotal role played by Ashaari Muhammad
as the leader of Al Arqam in attracting a following and laying the foundation of this
dakwah organisation should be recognised.  Given his experience in party politics,
knowledge of Islamic religious sciences and talent at public speaking, Ashaari had little
difficulty in convincing grassroots Muslims at first in Kuala Lumpur and then in other
parts of Malaysia that they could assume a strong role in local economics and politics by
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joining his jemaah and/or by making contributions in cash or in kind to the movement’s
jihad fund.  Through lectures and books, Ashaari tirelessly made it known what Al
Arqam’s mission was.  He also trained missionaries and made Islamic mysticism the
defining feature of the movement and a means to forge unity among his followers.  So by
late 1970s, Al Arqam owed it to Ashaari to develop a missionary system as well as a close
knit organisation with a culture of its own.  
In the 1970s, sustaining and defending this organisation was not that difficult
considering that the government was not hostile to dakwah groups.  During that time, the
issues that captured the imagination of the Malaysian government were communist
insurgency and racial harmony not Islamic resurgence.  Although wary of the dakwah
groups, the Malaysian government did not attempt to suppress them.  Instead it created
the Dakwah Foundation of Malaysia (Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia or YADIM) in
1974 and assigned it the specific task of coordinating the activities of individual preachers
and dakwah organisations in the country.  This decision had positive implications for the
growth and expansion of all dakwah groups, Al Arqam included.  They were free to
propagate their versions of Islam and mobilise mass support in ways they thought would
best realise their agenda.  
Al Arqam used this freedom to slowly build the alternative social structure described
above.  It also presented itself to the wider society as a self-conscious Islamic status
group devoted to reliving the Islamic past through mysticism and economic radicalism.
Its followers saw membership in Al Arqam as fulfilling a religious obligation to restore the
Islamic golden age.  Still organised as an egalitarian structure and other-worldly in
orientation, Al Arqam’s activism was aimed at stimulating personal transformation and
developing self-reliance among its followers not encouraging them to be politically
engaged.  During that time, Al Arqam used the concept of jihad to refer to quiet
perseverance not violent demonstrations or armed struggle.  Its members fulfilled the
need to jihad by expanding their efforts and money to develop Al Arqam’s business
enterprises, undertake mission work in and outside Malaysia, stage exhibitions, write,
publish and sell books and magazines concerning Al Arqam’s goals and achievements.  Al
Arqam had already resorted to mysticism but the latter functioned to help Al Arqam
followers forged spiritual and moral bonds with saints not to impart messianic messages
that could be used to organise Al Arqam members for political action.  In other words, Al
Arqam was non-political in the sense that it did not seek to rival with political parties and
other dakwah groups for control of the state.  
Nevertheless, tension between Al Arqam followers and other Muslims did develop
from time to time.  In Sungai Pencala for example, Al Arqam’s followers were criticised
for their holier-than-thou approach to religious matters.  People speculated that Ashaari
and his close followers actually used magic (seher ) to entice people to join the movement.
The unconventional lifestyle and Middle Eastern dress forms of Al Arqam members
became objects of ridicule and the media carried sporadic report about how women who
joined Al Arqam were married and then divorced by their husbands so other men could
marry them.  It was also not unknown for people to avoid befriending Al Arqam
followers because the latter were quick to interpret any good gesture shown by others
towards them as evidence of support for Al Arqam.7) However, these tensions did not
escalate into conflict.  
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The 1980s 
Defending Al Arqam as a dakwah organisation and the new religious tradition it
helped evolved proved to be quite a challenge in the years between 1980 and 1994.  For
one thing, Al Arqam by that time had expanded considerably in terms of membership,
size and activities.  The number of its members had risen from a few hundred in the 1978
to 10,000 in 1989.  In 1978, Al Arqam had only five communes but in the 1980s, fifteen
more were built in various parts of Malaysia making the total number of communes 23.
The movement’s economic and financial resources too had grown a lot as a result of Al
Arqam’s greater involvement in business in the fields of agriculture, education, food
production, transport and publications.  By 1990, Al Arqam’s assets were said to be
worth US $116 million and the movement had dakwah networks outside Malaysia in
countries like Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore and Uzbekistan.  However,
although Al Arqam’s growth was impressive, the movement was far from being a unified
and cohesive organisation as it was in the 1970s.  There were signs of power struggle
within the movement as more young and highly educated men joined the movement and
competed with the older and less educated senior members for leadership positions.
There was also growing dissatisfaction among many Al Arqam members over the way Al
Arqam’s funds were managed, used and distributed, Ashaari’s morality with respect to
women and the anti-intellectualism that had set in due to too much emphasis on
mysticism.  In the 1980s, there were leadership and management problems that were
rather unsettling that Ashaari and Al Arqam’s top echelon had to grapple with.
The 1980s also saw UMNO, PAS and other dakwah organisations stepping up their
own islamisation programmes, thereby putting demands on Al Arqam to review its own
agenda and strategies.  To strike chords with the dakwah people and to improve its
credentials as a spokesman of Islam, UMNO under Dr. Mahathir Mohammad brought in
Anwar Ibrahim, the President of ABIM and university professors in the fields of Islamic
studies into the state structure.  The party also lost no time integrating those Islamic
symbols, slogans, terminologies and concepts that were used by the dakwah groups into its
own Islamic discourses to emphasise similarities in terms of goals and interests with the
religious activists.  The 1980s also saw the Malaysian government implementing various
islamisation programmes that ranged from rhetorics on nilai-nilai murni literally meaning
‘sacred values’ to the creation of Islamic banking, financial and educational institutions.
UMNO’s opponent, PAS tried to outdo and outshine UMNO in matters pertaining to
Islam by adopting a ‘fundamentalist’ posture and making it clear that it wanted to set up
the Islamic state and implement the hudud law.  ABIM after losing Anwar to UMNO also
began expressing conditional support for the government by declaring that it was going to
be ‘proactive’ rather than ‘reactive’ to the government’s policies.  
Sensitive of changes taking place in Malaysian politics and the conflict and squabbles
within the movement, Ashaari and the top echelon of Al Arqam decided on a new trend
of ideological propagation.  This trend was one that called for a criticism of the state, other
dakwah organisations, PAS and UMNO.  Al Arqam continued to demonstrate a longing
for the glorious Islamic past but used it this time as the focus of its emphatic messages on
open antagonism against its enemies.  It was during these years that Ashaari began to tell
stories about the Mahdi and how to detect the great chaos that preceded the end of the
world.  In fact, Ashaari even published a book entitled ‘Aurad Muhammadiyah Pegangan
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Darul Arqam’ (translated as “Aurad Muhammadiyah as the Ideological Basis of the
Jemaah Darul Arqam”) to that effect.  In the book, he claimed that Sheikh Suhaimi bin
Abdullah, the founder of tareqat Muhammadiyah did not die and would re-emerge as the
Mahdi.  Ashaari did not just impart messianic messages to the people.  He also criticised
the religious officials, especially those who worked at the Islamic Research Centre in
Kuala Lumpur, for being corrupt and interested only in material gains such as job
promotion, salary increment and professional perks.  In another book entitled Ulamak
Dalam Pandangan Islam (translated as “Ulamak From the Islamic Point of View”), Ashaari
labelled the religious officials as ulamak suk or ‘bad ulamak’.  PAS, UMNO and ABIM too
were not spared of criticisms.  Ashaari questioned the credibility of these organisations as
the spokesmen of Islam.  According to him, they could not and should not represent
Islam because UMNO, PAS and ABIM were motivated less by a concern for the moral
and spiritual well being of the ummah as by their own self interests.  
By making the above assertions, Ashaari entered into open conflict with the state and
invited more hostile feelings from PAS and ABIM.  As a result, the book Aurad
Muhammadiyah Pegangan Darul Arqam’ was banned on the basis that it had damaging
effects on the beliefs and faith of the Muslims.  Undeterred Al Arqam members started to
spin stories to emphasise Ashaari’s holiness.  When Ashaari fled Malaysia to take refuge
in Phuket in 1986, his followers claimed that he had vanished or ghaib, something that
only holy men could do.  Then a story aimed at emphasising Ashaari’s saintly status was
circulated that when he visited the Cave of the Seven Sleepers in Jordan, the seven
young men who were referred to as the Ashabul Kahfi, appeared and paid homage to
him.  In his absence, the upper echelon of Al Arqam also provided vivid accounts of how
their leader managed to influence heads of states, including Dr. Mahathir and President
Soeharto, to come around to his way of thinking.  They also organized a special Sufi
collective rite called majlis yaqazah to verify that the magico-mystical power (karama)
that resided in Sheikh Suhaimi had filtered into Ashaari, thereby making him the
mujaddid.  
Then in June 1994, news had it that Ashaari had held a dialogue with Prophet
Muhammad in the Kaabah in Mekka.  The Prophet was said to instruct Ashaari to
return to Malaysia to prepare for the arrival of Imam Mahdi.  Assuming now the name of
Abuya Imam Ashaari Muhammad At Tamimi and seeing himself as the mujaddid,
Ashaari proclaimed that he would build an army called the Badr army (Tentera Badr ).
This army one day would take over Malaysia from the present government.  These
messianic messages notwithstanding, Ashaari also reiterated his earlier charges about
the immoral practices and corruption among religious officials and politicians and through
a piece of writing, even challenged Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad to a
popularity contest.8)
It was Ashaari’s messianic messages and attacks on UMNO that pushed the Malaysian
government to take steps to ban Al Arqam.  First, a meeting of top level officials from
Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Brunei where Al Arqam had taken roots was
convened to assess the movement’s activities.  Then on 5 August 1994, the National Fatwa
Council of Malaysia met and issued a ruling that banned Al Arqam’s teachings.9)
Following the ban, the Malaysian government detained Ashaari and several top Al
Arqam leaders under the Internal Security Act for a few years.  When they subsequently
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admitted to their mistakes, on 14 October 1994, Ashaari and his followers denounced Al
Arqam publicly over the national television.  They then underwent a rehabilitation
programme to help them reintegrate into mainstream society.  Ashaari, however was
placed under ‘restricted residence’ for several more years.  Al Arqam’s communes were
disbanded but arrangements were later made for some of the former members of the
movement to continue operate Al Arqam’s companies under the name of Rufaqa
Corporation.10)
Clearly by concentrating a lot of their actions trying to convince members of the
Muslim public that Ashaari Muhammad was a saintly person and to anticipate the
coming of the messiah, Arqam projected a different image in the years between 1980 to
1994.  The movement was seen as sectarian, cultic, non-compliant and defiant.  The
Islamic identity that it produced during that time was not a desirable one from the state’s
point of view.  It was also politically threatening and menacing.  From the point of view of
its adversaries, Al Arqam could no longer be dismissed as an apolitical dakwah
organisation.  The movement had assumed political significance for several reason.  Al
Arqam had been able to bring to the attention of the Malaysian public issues of
corruption and social injustices that the government would not want to be highlighted.  It
also questioned the political system and might put a stake to militancy in order to realise
its political agenda because to Al Arqam members, jihad now meant armed combat
against unjust and oppressive leaders.  Furthermore, Al Arqam’s organisational discipline,
economic independence and direct interaction with the grassroots through its daily
economic and social dealings were potentials that the movement could tap into if it
decided to be a political force.11) All these go to show that in the 1980s, there was
obvious rivalry and competition between Al Arqam, UMNO, PAS and ABIM for control
over the state, the people, political space and Islamic symbols and institutions.  In the
competition, Al Arqam did not consider it important to forge alliances with other groups
so it could negotiate better with the state.  So without real support from other groups, it
was relatively easy for the Al Arqam to be forced out of the political arena by the
pervasive and powerful Malaysian state.
Conclusion
From the preceding discussion, three conclusions can be drawn.  The first concerns the
role of Al Arqam.  Even though Al Arqam no longer exists, its role in highlighting the
problems and social injustices suffered by the Malays as a result of the implementation of
capitalist-based projects must be recognised.  Second, the emergence of Al Arqam should
not be seen as a sectarian movement.  No doubt, by placing a great deal of stress on
mysticism, messianism, jihad and communal living Al Arqam produced a new route to
Islamic orthodoxy.  However this should not be construed as a protest against the
prevailing belief system only.  It was also a political response to western cultural
intrusions, uneven development and social injustices.  Finally, it can be concluded that the
experience of Al Arqam illustrates the authorities’ determination to police the boundaries
of Islamic religious orthodoxy and national security, thereby suppressing freedom of
religion and expression.  Evidently in handling Al Arqam, the state took away this
freedom from Al Arqam in order to ensure that other equally prized values namely of
multi-racial harmony, peace and tolerance could prevail.  
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